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Introduction
On September 19, 2015, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the Japanese 
government passed a national security bill which allowed Japanʼs Self 
Defense Force (SDF) to exercise a “collective defense” under the constraints 
of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits the possession and 
use of military force as a means of settling international disputes.
The Japanese Communist Party labeled the security bill as a “war 
bill” and registered its passionate opposition by appealing to ordinary 
citizens, proclaiming the danger of re-militarizing Japan. This Communist 
campaign, built upon a strong anti-war culture in postwar Japan, was and 
still is vigorously supported by the nationʼs education, which inculcates that 
paciﬁsm is integral to good governance.
For the last seventy-three years, since the end of World War II, the 
Japanese people have been thoroughly schooled on the absolute virtue of 
paciﬁsm, as expressed by Article 9. The merest mention of potential war 
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triggers fear and a reﬂexive aversion to anything related to the military. As 
a result of the Communist campaign, tens of thousands of people gathered 
in front of the Diet building and in major cities nationwide, raising their 
voices against the governmentʼs forceful passage of the security bill. The 
protests against the Abe government became particularly vocal after several 
prominent scholars of the constitution stated in public that the Abe security 
bill was unconstitutional. Although the government insists that Japanʼs 
security is at risk in the current dangerous international climate, and that 
the new law is indispensable to the countryʼs protection against potential 
enemies, many people remain unconvinced.
The majority party, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 
has been advocating revisions to the constitution (i.e., Article 9). Since its 
establishment in 1955, the LDP insisted that the Japanese constitution was 
humiliatingly imposed by the U.S. during its occupation. Meanwhile, the 
Japanese government has been using Article 9 to reject the pressure from the 
U.S. for its rearmament and to become fully responsible for its own defense. 
The U.S. pressure on Japan to rearm has a long history, but the Japanese 
government has never revised the constitution because of powerful domestic 
opposition from paciﬁst leaders and educators who defend Article 9.
The United States, in contrast, had no such troubled emotions 
regarding Abeʼs new law. For the American government, this security law 
is a necessary step toward Japanʼs role in a security alliance. However, the 
majority of Japanese people view such American pressure as a dangerous 
push toward re-militarizing Japan and, subsequently, its positioning as an 
unwilling participant in U.S. military operations worldwide. A signiﬁcant 
gap in the understanding of international political situations exists between 
the government and the common citizens.
Why is there such strong opposition to a revision of Article 9, and 
such vehement protest against any hint of military-related endeavors 
by Japanʼs SDF? The Japanese attitude regarding national security has 
remained unchanged since the Cold War era, despite dramatic changes in 
geopolitics in the intervening years. Paciﬁsm has been deeply inculcated into 
the Japanese psyche through school education and media reports, which 
have been dominated by left-leaning intellectuals. There is a long historical 
conﬂict between the conservatives and progressives (e.g., leftist, communist) 
regarding Japanese national security.
To understand why the Japanese intellectuals maintain such a deep-
rooted distrust of the conservative government and the U.S. government, 
we must examine the history of ideological polarization among the Japanese 
during the Occupation and the Cold War period.
Japanese conservatives (at the upper echelons of politics and business) 
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were pro-American (anti-communist). On the opposite side were those leftists 
(progressives) in academia, the mass media, and labor unions who suffered 
gravely as the result of the anti-communist hysteria during the Occupation. 
Those individuals have become anti-American, if not patently pro-Soviet 
Union. While politicians and businessmen maintained the anti-communist 
conservative view, the progressives prevailed in universities and the mass 
media. This allowed them to shape public opinion, which is critical of the 
conservative governmentʼs policies and skeptical of U.S. foreign policies.
This paper argues that the privately initiated U.S. cultural exchange 
program unintentionally helped the dominant pro-American Japanese 
group and antagonized the leftists, consequently failing to close the gap in 
the perception regarding the American and Japanese dynamic. As a result of 
this gap in perception, the U.S. could not persuade the Japanese to go along 
with its plans.
As a backdrop, this paper ﬁrst reviews the U.S. policy toward 
Japan during the Occupation by focusing on aspects of which Japanese 
intellectuals, such as academics and journalists, have been very critical. 
Then, the U.S. governmentʼs cultural exchange policy toward postwar Japan 
will be discussed. Finally, an actual U.S.–Japan interchange program will 
be discussed as an example of a private organization-initiated propaganda 
policy toward Japan. Its failure and the consequences will be discussed in 
closing.
I. Historical Background: Political and Cultural Exchanges
On September 2, 1945, the Japanese delegates signed the document of 
surrender on the U.S. battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. During the six years 
and eight months of the Allied occupation of Japan (September 1945 through 
April 1952), Japan underwent drastic changes.
Although, the Allied powers occupied Japan as a collective in principle, 
in reality, the United States monopolized the occupation by formulating 
policies in a vacuum until the policy machinery for the Allies as a collective 
was established in 1946. However, the bickering multinational policymaking 
bodies could not function effectively, which allowed the U.S. government 
to remain in the position of sole policymaker.1 In essence, the United States 
1 Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, “Forward: The Philosophy of the Occupation,” in 
SCAP, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, 
vol. 1, xix–xx.
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independently determined the most critical policies of the occupation.
The United States wanted to ensure that Japan would never again 
threaten Americaʼs security. The aim of the Occupation was to transform 
a defeated imperial Japan into a democratic, America-friendly, paciﬁst 
nation, a change that required not only the dismantlement of Japanʼs prewar 
system but also the destruction of its peopleʼs earlier beliefs. Thus, under the 
banner of democratization, the United Statesʼ intention was to disarm Japan 
both physically and psychologically.2 General Douglas MacArthur (1889–
1964), the celebrated Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), 
implemented a revolutionary regime change to achieve this aim. SCAP took 
steps to erase any military inﬂuence within Japanese society. All remnants of 
the war machine were thoroughly destroyed.
American policymakers understood that the purpose of Japanʼs prewar 
education had been to foster nationalism, encourage loyalty to the emperor, 
and ensure the subordination of the individual to the state. The U.S. State 
Department called the Japanese education system “a means of indoctrinating 
students and teachers with the ideology of aggressive nationalism.”3 Hence, 
the U.S. government immediately dismantled the militaristic and nationalistic 
educational practices that were previously in place. The Americans instituted 
a number of reforms, including the following: (1) outlawing nationalistic and 
militaristic ideology; (2) establishing academic freedom; (3) encouraging 
democratic principles; (4) removing militaristic and nationalistic teachers 
and administrators; (5) encouraging democratically inclined teachers and 
supporting the formation of teachersʼ associations; and (6) changing the 
hierarchical administration of educational institutions.4 To this end, the Civil 
Information and Education Section (CIE) at the General Headquarters (GHQ) 
in Tokyo supervised reforms in education, religion, and the media.5
For these radical changes to take effect, the Americans needed “liberal 
Japanese” to embrace the new goal of a democratic and peace-loving Japan 
and to cooperate with such drastic reforms. Throughout the Occupation, 
however, the U.S. deﬁnition of “liberal Japanese” remained unarticulated. 
Regardless of the countryʼs unconditional surrender, the Japanese still 
2 United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan in SCAP, Government Section, 
Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, vol. 2, 424; Basic Directive for 
Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper (JCS 1380/15, November 3, 1945), in 
Appendix A:13 in SCAP, Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to 
September 1948, vol. 2, 429.
3 Department of State, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison, “Progress in the 
Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender,” December 9, 1946, iii, 1, 16–19, 57.
4 “Progress in the Field of Education in Japan since the Surrender,” December 9, 1946, iv, 
4–13.
5 SCAP, CIE, Education Division, Education in the New Japan, vol. 2, 58.
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worshipped the emperor as the inviolable spiritual head of the nation. 
Before the war, only hardline communists had loudly criticized the imperial 
system, and as a result, were imprisoned for twenty years by the Japanese 
government. If the Americans wanted real “liberals,” they had to free the 
communists from prison. However, they viewed these communists as covert 
warriors for the Soviet Union. Together, these two factors posed a signiﬁcant 
dilemma for the GHQ. 
To the imperial Japanese government, communists were the archenemy 
of the imperial system and its capitalist economy. Moreover, communism 
was the ideology of the treacherous Soviet Union, a nation that had broken 
its neutrality treaty with Japan and launched a massive, murderous attack on 
an already powerless Japan.
Ironically, both the U.S. government and the Japanese communists 
wanted to eliminate militarism and fascism and establish a new democratic 
Japan. Hence, the U.S. policy makers concluded that the Japanese communists, 
who had fought militarism, could become valuable allies. In October 1945, to 
publicize the idea that America promoted “freedom of thought,” the GHQ in 
Tokyo released staunchly anti-war communists from their lengthy solitary 
conﬁnement and legalized the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), despite the 
impassioned objection of the Japanese government. This move by the U.S. 
dramatically demonstrated to the Japanese public that the United States was 
indeed “a promoter of human rights and liberty,” a perception which was 
expected to enhance the American inﬂuence in Asia.6 GHQ seemed to respect 
liberty for all, despite observing the increasing encroachment of Soviet and 
Chinese communists in Europe, Asia, and particularly in occupied Japan.
The new constitution of Japan, written in English in a week by 
MacArthurʼs GHQ staff, laid the foundation for a democratic Japan: 
sovereign powers were held not by the emperor but by the people. The new 
constitution embraced Americaʼs Bill of Rights, establishing suffrage for all 
people, including women, beginning at the age of twenty; equality of all 
family members under the law; and an independent judiciary system with 
the power of judicial review to safeguard these rights. In addition, the new 
constitution added a provision, Article 23, which read, “Academic freedom 
is guaranteed.” This simple phrase was interpreted as a safeguard for 
“university autonomy and the rights of academic professionals to academic 
investigation and expression,” offering legal protection from undue control 
by the state.7 Most famously, with Article 9, Japan renounced both war and 
the maintenance of military forces, even for self-defense.
6 Henry Oinas-Kukkonen, Tolerance, Suspicion and Hostility: Changing U.S. Attitudes toward 
the Japanese Communist Movement, 1944–1947 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003), 2–3, 5.
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The MacArthur-initiated reforms beneﬁted Japanese communists most 
of all. As of December 1945, among the thirty-nine newly established postwar 
political parties, only the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) advocated the 
sovereignty of the people.8 The goals of the GHQʼs reforms eerily resembled 
those of the JCP, which claimed the GHQ as one of their few, if not best, 
friends.
The “Reverse Course” and the Red Purge
The alliance between the GHQ and the communists was short-lived. The 
growing communist inﬂuence in universities began to alarm the Americans 
in Tokyo. Following the defeat of Japanese militarism, many Japanese 
intellectuals openly embraced Marxism as the guiding philosophy of a new 
political order, and some willingly joined the newly legalized Japanese 
Communist Party (JCP).
In 1947, two years after the start of the U.S. Occupation, the long-
simmering antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union 
ﬁnally erupted. In this context, MacArthur came to view communists as more 
dangerous than the “reactionary Japanese” who had been purged soon after 
the war. To counter this threat, MacArthur purged the domestic communists. 
The education sector underwent both a covert and overt Red Purge from 
September 1949 to March 1951, in which communists and sympathizers were 
ousted from society: an estimated thirty to forty communist professors were 
dismissed from their posts. Leftists and liberal intellectuals have harshly 
criticized this Red Purge as an infringement on freedom of thought and 
academic freedom, decrying it as a behavior violating both the letter and the 
spirit of the Japanese Constitution. After the Korean War broke out in June 
1950, those Japanese who were labeled ultra-nationalists and purged from 
their public ofﬁces in the initial period of the Occupation were allowed to 
return to their former posts as the “real friends of the United States.”
Peace Treaties and Rearmament Pressure
In October 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the Peopleʼs 
Republic of China, controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. Most 
American ofﬁcials in Washington saw the loss of China to communists as a 
7 Lawrence Ward Beer, Freedom of Expression in Japan: A Study in Comparative Law, Politics, 
and Society (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1984), 253.
8 Nihon Kyōsantōno Chūō Iinkai, Nihon Kyōsantōno 65-nen, vol. 1 (Nihon Kyōsantō Chūo 
Iinkai Shuppankyoku, 1988), 102; Robert Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-
1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 48.
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threat to American interests in Asia.9
As early as September 1949, the United States initiated negotiations with 
Britain and France to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. The question of 
whether the Soviet Union would participate in such a treaty was a potential 
diplomatic powder keg. The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) stressed its 
desire for “a comprehensive peace” with each of the countryʼs former enemies, 
including the Soviet Union and the Peopleʼs Republic of China. However, 
under conservative Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshidaʼs cabinet, the Japanese 
government was considering the possibility of “a separate peace treaty” with 
only the U.S. bloc.10 Article 9 of the Japanese constitution prohibited Japan 
from having a military force or engaging in war, so the question of how to 
guarantee Japanʼs security after regaining its independence was integral to 
any possible peace treaty.
Some of Yoshidaʼs comments on the treaty implied that to solve Japanʼs 
security problem, the Japanese government might accept the presence of U.S. 
military bases in Japan, a suggestion the JCP angrily opposed, claiming that 
Yoshidaʼs real intention was the revival of the Japanese military.11 This attack 
marked a 180-degree pivot from the JCPʼs original stance: it had publicly 
opposed Article 9, arguing that Japan should have the right to defend itself 
with its own military force. The JCP declared that GHQ policies revealed 
Washingtonʼs hidden agenda, which was to colonize Japan.12 From then on, 
the JCPʼs stance of protecting Article 9 became a rallying cry as it worked to 
gain public support.
Disagreement regarding the peace treaty increased tensions between 
the conservative government and the opposition parties. After analyzing 
editorials and media reports, U.S. intelligence concluded that the majority of 
Japanʼs public opinion leaders were in favor of a “comprehensive peace treaty,” 
which would engage all of Japanʼs former enemies. The analysis suggested 
that the Japanese were worried that if their country concluded a peace treaty 
that did not involve the neighboring communist countries, Japan would have 
to live in constant fear. In addition, losing good relations with China meant 
that Japan would sacriﬁce a large market that was necessary for its economic 
recovery.13 Even so, the Yoshida government pushed for a peace treaty with 
9 Chizuru Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan: Promoting Democracy 1948—
1960 (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2008), 39.
10 Takeshi Igarashi, “Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic 
Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan,” Journal of Japanese Studies 11, no. 2 (1987): 327; Toshio 
Nishi, Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952 (Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 263.
11 United States, Department of State, Ofﬁce of Intelligence Research (OIR), File 097.3 
Z1092 #OIR-5136A, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Peace Treaty Problems,” February 28, 1950, 4–5.
12 OIR, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Peace Treaty Problems,” February 28, 1950, 6–7.
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only the U.S. bloc, a stance against which the JCP spearheaded a vehement 
verbal attack. Japanese intellectuals, and particularly academics, were in 
favor of a neutral Japan forged from the comprehensive treaty, and sided 
with the JCP. Japanese academics criticized Yoshida, and the peace treaty 
issue further embittered the relationship between the Yoshida government 
and academics who had already been soured by the Red Purge.
Another complicating factor was the outbreak of the Korean War on 
June 25, 1950. This war determined the position of Japan during the Cold 
War in Asia. On July 8, 1950, the transport of American troops from Japan 
to the Korean Peninsula coincided with MacArthurʼs order to Yoshida to 
form a 75,000-member national police reserve and to add 8,000 men to the 
maritime police.14 To justify this about-face, MacArthur had to announce that 
the Japanese Constitution did not deny the possession of military forces for 
“self-defense.”15
With the start of the Korean War, the United States began pressuring 
the Japanese government to rearm: the same country that had imposed the 
paciﬁst Article 9 on Japan was now trying to dispose of it. The new Japanʼs 
ideology of paciﬁsm, which had now pervaded the Japanese psyche, was so 
strong that this shift in U.S. policy bewildered the Japanese people and their 
skepticism toward American policy grew into anti-American sentiment.16
On September 8, 1951, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed without 
the participation of the Soviet Union and the Peopleʼs Republic of China. On 
the same day, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was signed, which allowed the 
United States to retain military bases in Japan. The treaty became effective on 
April 28, 1952, when the Occupation ofﬁcially ended.17
13 OIR, “Japanese Attitudes Toward Peace Treaty Problems,” February 28, 1950, 4–5.
14 Igarashi, “Peace-Making and Party Politics,” 329.
15 Masaru Tamamoto, “Unwanted Peace: Japanese Intellectual Thought in American 
Occupied Japan, 1948–1952” (Ph.D. diss., The Johns Hopkins University, 1988), 137.
16 Toshihiro Menju, “The Development of Grassroots International Exchange in Japan and 
the Impact of American Philanthropy,” in Philanthropy and Reconciliation: Rebuilding Postwar 
U.S.–Japan Relations, ed. Tadashi Yamamoto, Akira Iriye, and Makoto Iokibe (Tokyo: Japan 
Center for International Exchange, 2006), 255.
17 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 41. However, the islands of Okinawa 
remained under the authority of the U.S. Government (the U.S. military was the de fact ruler 
of the island). With the intensiﬁcation of the Cold War, the U.S. regarded the geographic 
position of Okinawa as strategically important and its long-term rule over the islands had 
been a ﬁxed policy. Okinawaʼs reversion to Japan was realized on May 15, 1972. However, the 
U.S. military bases on the Okinawa islands remained the same: 75% of the U.S. military bases 
in the land area of Japan are located in Okinawa. Therefore, the U.S. military has retained 
signiﬁcant control over the islands. Okinawaʼs History, 5. Postwar Okinawa, “Defeat and 
U.S. Occupation” “USCAR and the Struggle for Autonomous Rights” http://rca.open.ed.jp/
web_e/history/story/epoch5/outline.html (accessed on November 24, 2017).
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II. The U.S. Post-Occupation Policy toward Japan
In the early 1950s, waves of anti-American sentiment among the Japanese 
grew out of the prolonged occupation, a difﬁcult economic situation, and the 
U.S. pressure on the Japanese government to rearm.18 This sentiment had 
been fanned by anti-U.S. propaganda orchestrated by communists and their 
sympathizers. In particular, Japanese intellectuals criticized the inconsistency 
of U.S. policy during the Occupation, noting that it had shifted from 
demanding the complete disarmament of Japan to the pursuit of rearmament 
to turn Japan into an American fortress in East Asia.19 Japanese academia was 
dominated by so-called progressives, who described the history of the U.S. 
occupation of Japan as a failure and coined the term “the reverse course” to 
describe these dramatic changes in the U.S. policy toward Japan.
The U.S. Embassy in Japan conducted research on the prevailing Japanese 
view of the United States in February 1952, two months before the end of the 
Occupation (April 1952). According to its report, “Psychological Factors in 
Japan,” dated February 28, 1952, Japanese public opinion showed “Japanʼs 
ignorance of the real nature of the Soviet Union and Soviet foreign policy.” In 
this view, Japanese leftists, easily fooled by communist propaganda, wrongly 
assumed that the Soviet Union was a socialist state aspiring to create a world 
utopia under the leadership of the labor class, with broad humanitarian aims. 
These naïve, gullible Japanese leftists encouraged “the concept of neutrality, 
continued disarmament, and resistance to the alliance with the United 
States.”20
To correct these distorted perceptions of the Soviet Union and to counter 
anti-American propaganda in Japan, the U.S. authority applied signiﬁcant 
effort towards instilling a true understanding of American democracy 
through censorship and anti-communist measures during the Occupation, 
as well as through cultural exchange programs following the Occupation. 
Through such programs, the United States endeavored to correct the Japanese 
perception of the U.S. that was tainted by communist propaganda to foster 
pro-American feelings among the Japanese.
The U.S. cultural exchange programs in post-occupation Japan were 
a form of “information” diplomacy (that is “propaganda”) and were one of 
the key strategies of the U.S. government during the Cold War. One feature 
of U.S. policy, especially “information” diplomacy, was that the policies 
were mainly implemented through private organizations (NGOs). Indeed, 
18 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 43.
19 Ibid., 42.
20 Ibid., 46.
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as Emily S. Rosenberg argues, through lobbying organizations and think 
tanks, private American organizations have signiﬁcantly shaped U.S. foreign 
policy, particularly following World War II.21 The policies of the U.S. toward 
Japan were no exception.
The Cold War: A Propaganda War
Howard B. Schonberger, in Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking 
of Japan, 1945–1952, reveals that a group of powerful individuals, the so-
called “Japan Lobby,” pressured the U.S. government to alter its Occupation 
policy from democratization and demilitarization to economic recovery and 
remilitarization by taking advantage of the situation created by the Cold 
War. This group, ofﬁcially known as the American Council on Japan, was 
formally established in June 1948.22
Working from Schonbergerʼs study, Glenn Davis and John G. Roberts, 
veteran journalists on Japan, discuss a hidden, or rather, avoided subject: How 
the American Council on Japan (ACJ), a powerful private group composed 
of “big business” leaders and government and military elites, “consistently 
and purposefully circumvented, obstructed, or torpedoed the democratic 
process to achieve its objective of maintaining Japan as a dutiful American 
Cold War ally.”23 Their painstaking, in-depth research reveals that many, if 
not most, members of the ACJ had also been members of the Council on 
Foreign Relations (CFR), a group of American foreign policy experts based 
in New York.24
Established in 1921 in New York, a think tank called the Council on 
Foreign Relations, is, according to its own document, “an independent, 
national membership organization and a private nonpartisan center for 
scholars dedicated to producing and disseminating ideas” on world affairs 
and U.S. foreign policy. The group, which publishes Foreign Affairs magazine, 
the “preeminent journal covering international affairs and U.S. foreign 
policy,” has played a key role in shaping American policies on world affairs. 
Although the current organization (as of 2006) claimed that “the council 
takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no afﬁliation with the 
21 Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading American Dreams: Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890-
1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), 12.
22 “1943-1955-The Kay Sugahara Electronic Archives (working draft), p1, http://
kayasugaharatesting.weebly.com/1943-1955.html (accessed on November 24, 2017); Howard 
B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952 (Kent, OH: 
Kent State University Press, 1989).
23 Glenn Davis and John G. Roberts, An Occupation without Troops: Wall Street’s Half-Century 
Domination of Japanese Politics (Tokyo: Yenbooks, 1996), 14.
24 Ibid., 147.
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U.S. government,”25 the membership rolls show that many council members 
joined the presidential cabinet, particularly during the postwar and Cold 
War eras, serving in critical roles that helped mold U.S. foreign policy.26
Starting at the end of World War I, the CFRʼs members had direct 
inﬂuence on major foreign policy decisions made by the United States.27  
During World War II, the leaders of the CFRʼs “War and Peace Studies 
Project” were incorporated into the U.S. State Departmentʼs Advisory 
Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy. In other words, the CFRʼs own studies 
on wartime and postwar planning foreign policy were implemented in the 
State Departmentʼs planning.28
The CFRʼs members also played a crucial role in the development 
of the countryʼs Cold War policies. On March 12, 1947, President Truman 
announced The Truman Doctrine before the U.S. Congress, which called for 
the containment of communism. Emphasizing the need to protect the United 
States and Europe, he urged Congress to approve the dispatch of military and 
economic aid to Greece and Turkey to combat communismʼs encroachment 
there.29 Further, in June 1947, Truman announced a massive economic aid 
plan for Western Europe called the “Marshall Plan.” Such a bold gesture 
triggered an aggressive response from the Soviet Union. The enmity between 
the two nations escalated into the Cold War.
In May 1947, the State Department established a new group, the Policy 
Planning Staff, to formulate a long-range Cold War strategy. CFR member 
George F. Kennan (1904–2005), who had ﬁrst advocated the communist 
containment policy in Foreign Affairs, became a chief architect of this strategy. 
Truman established the National Security Council (NSC), which consolidated 
numerous agencies that had been simultaneously waging the Cold War.30
War of Ideas
As the Cold War policies and strategies were developed, the U.S. 
government recognized the importance of informing the rest of the world 
of its policy stance as communist propaganda smeared U.S. policy as 
25 The Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/history-and-theory-of-
international-relations/continuing-inquiry/p108 (accessed on August 23, 2015).
26 Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign 
Relations and Unites States Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 17; Davis 
and Roberts, An Occupation without Troops, 150.
27 Davis and Roberts, An Occupation without Troops, 147.
28 Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust, 29.
29 Katherine A. S. Sibley, The Cold War (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998), 8, 139.
30 Sibley, The Cold War, 132; Yonosuke Nagai, “The Roots of Cold War Doctrine: The 
Esoteric and the Exoteric,” in The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 27.
RJIS［Vol. 27, 2019］66
“imperialism.” The governmentʼs desperate need to explain American 
foreign policy and its principles to the rest of the world prompted Congress 
to endorse various propaganda programs. Public Law 402, the so-called 
Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which aimed “to promote a better understanding 
of the United States in other countries,” provided the Truman administration 
with the legal and ﬁnancial grounds for establishing an information service 
and an educational exchange division.31 The State Department created 
the Ofﬁce of International Information (OII) and the Ofﬁce of Educational 
Exchange (OEX).32 This marked the ﬁrst time in American history that the 
U.S. government committed to international information and educational 
exchange programs on a global scale during peacetime.33
The Cold War increasingly became a “war of ideas,” a “battle for 
hearts and minds,” or “ideological warfare.” Consequently, the Cold War 
“institutionalized propaganda as a central component of American foreign 
policy.”34 However, most people in the United States think of propaganda 
as a manipulative, deceitful practice: it has distinct negative connotations in 
the American mind and could not be referred to as such when discussed 
and promoted publicly. Hence, the U.S. government employed numerous 
euphemisms for their propaganda, such as “information.”35
Multiple U.S. “information” and cultural strategies were developed to 
counter Soviet propaganda. In April 1950, Truman launched the “Campaign 
of Truth” to negate the appeal of Soviet propaganda. He told the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors:
This is a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men. Propaganda 
is one of the most powerful weapons the Communists have in this 
struggle. They systematically use deceit, distortions, and lies as a 
matter of deliberate policy. This propaganda can be overcome by 
truth—presented by newspapers, radio, and other sources that 
people trust. ... Unless we get the real story across to people in other 
countries, we will lose the battle for menʼs minds by default.36
When the Cold War manifested in an actual armed battle with the onset 
of the Korean War in June 1950, Truman switched the peacetime label of 
31 Quoted in Lawrence Ward Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the 
Cold War, 32–33.
32 Belmonte, Selling the American Way, 33.
33 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 26–27.
34 Kenneth A. Osgood, “Propaganda” http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/propaganda.
aspx (accessed on September 22, 2015).
35 Ibid.
36 Quoted in Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 27.
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“information” to a wartime moniker, the “psychological warfare effort.” He 
issued a Presidential Directive on April 4, 1951 to establish the Psychological 
Strategy Board (PSB) to “authorize and provide for the more effective 
planning, coordination, and conduct within the framework of approved 
national policies, of psychological operations…. The PBS was composed 
of the Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the 
Director of Central Intelligence, or their designated representatives”37 and it 
was instructed to report to the National Security Council. The PBS conducted 
planning for psychological operations, such as the countryʼs cultural and 
information campaigns through mass media, publications, ﬁlms, libraries, 
and educational exchange in two strategically important countries, West 
Germany and Japan.38
In May 1950, just before the Korean War erupted, Truman appointed 
another CFR member, John Foster Dulles (1888–1959), the chairman of 
the Rockefeller Foundations and the chief foreign policy advisor for the 
Republican Party,39 as special ambassador to Japan. From June 21st to the 27th 
1950, “the Dulles group” visited Japan to gain a better understanding of the 
real situation in Japan regarding the peace treaty.40 The Korean War broke 
out on June 25, 1950 during their stay in Japan.
In January 1951, Truman sent Dulles to Japan again on a peace mission 
known as “the Dulles Mission,” to lay the groundwork for a peace treaty with 
Japan. Dulles invited his benefactor, philanthropist John. D. Rockefeller III 
(1906–1978), to join the mission as a cultural affairs consultant. Rockefeller 
was in charge of advising Dulles on how to strengthen the U.S.–Japan 
relationship through intellectual and cultural exchange.41 Before World 
War II, the Rockefeller Foundation supported the conferences held by the 
Institute of Paciﬁc Relations (IPR): hence, Rockefellerʼs name was well known 
in Japan, especially among ﬁnanciers and intellectuals. In fact, the IPR was 
the most signiﬁcant channel for Japanese–American intellectual exchange 
before the war.42
After researching the situation in Japan, Rockefeller submitted his 
37 “Collection Description, Harry S. Truman Papers Staff Member and Ofﬁce Files: 
Psychological Strategy Board Files Dates: 1951-1953.” https://www.trumanlibrary.org/
hstpaper/psysc.htm (accessed on June 1, 2018).
38 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 28.
39 Davis and Roberts, An Occupation without Troops, 35, 40.
40 “Summary Report by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles), drafted by Mr. Allison 
[who accompanied Dulls for the visit], [Washington] July 3 1950, United States, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Paciﬁc, Volume VI, 794.00/7-750, https://
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/d728 (accessed on November 5, 2017).
41 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 115–116; Fumiko Fujita, “The U.S.-
Japan Intellectual Interchange Program and U.S.-Japan Relations in the 1950s,” University of 
Tokyo Journal of American Studies 5 (2000): 70.
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recommendations to Dulles on April 16, 1951. His own research was 
substantially supplemented by the assistance of scholars and diplomats who 
had in-depth knowledge on Japan.43 The report suggested two strategies to 
persuade the Japanese to follow the American democratic model through 
cultural exchange programs: (1) the U.S. should develop contacts with 
Japanese intellectual leaders through “selective and direct channels” and (2) 
the U.S. should approach the Japanese people as a collective through mass 
communication media. The report emphasized that the cultural programs 
should be “private in nature” and maintain complete separation from ofﬁcial 
governmental ofﬁces.44 These recommendations became the guidelines for 
the U.S. government strategy in Japan. This privately initiated approach was 
adopted as a core foreign policy by the next president, Dwight D. Eisenhower.
In January 1953, Eisenhower, a CFR member and Foreign Affairs editorial 
advisory board member, was inaugurated as president of the United States. 
John Foster Dulles was appointed the secretary of state.45 A former general 
and expert on psychological warfare, Eisenhower considered effective 
psychological strategy imperative to winning the Cold War. With the advent 
of nuclear bombs, the physical military means of confronting the enemy 
became almost obsolete: he explored the cultural exchange programs as an 
effective alternative for containing communism. In January 1953, Eisenhower 
established the Jackson Committee, which discussed the role of psychological 
warfare in the conduct of foreign policy.46 After investigating the methods 
and contents of the Sovietʼs systematic, yet crude, propaganda campaign, 
the Jackson Committee called for the “expanded use of private groups, 
non-governmental organizations, and ordinary Americans as vehicle[s] 
for transmitting propaganda messages.”47 In order to prevent any such 
program from appearing propagandistic, Eisenhower favored a friendly 
way of promoting positive views of the U.S. through informal contacts. 
Subsequently, Eisenhower launched the “People to People Program,” in which 
42 Makoto Iokibe, “U.S.–Japan Intellectual Exchange: The Relationship between 
Government and Private Foundation,” in Philanthropy and Reconciliation: Rebuilding Postwar 
U.S.–Japan Relations, 69.
43 These individuals included “Edwin Reischauer, Hugh Borton, Sir George Samson, 
Burton Fahns, Eileen Donovan, and Douglas Overton.” Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold 
War Japan, 116.
44 Ibid., 117.
45 Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust, 37.
46 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and 
Abroad (Laurence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 2006), 46-53; Saeki, U.S. Cultural 
Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 29; Fumiko Fujita, Amerika bunka gaiko to nihon: Reisen ki no 
bunka to hito no koryu (U.S. Cultural Diplomacy and Japan in the Cold War Era) (Tokyo: Tokyo 
daigaku shuppankai, 2015), 12-13.
47 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 31.
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the government encouraged ordinary Americans to develop friendly contacts 
with foreigners to convince them of the beauty of American democracy and 
the greatness of American culture.48
To implement this new policy, Eisenhower announced the creation of 
the United States Information Agency (USIA) in the State Department in 
June 1953.49 It incorporated all outbound government information programs 
and bore all responsibility for overseas information activities targeted at 
foreigners. The United States Information Service (USIS) represented the 
overseas ofﬁces of the USIA, which had more than 190 posts in 141 countries.50 
This reorganization of information activities was meant to concentrate the 
authority over psychological warfare in the hands of the executive branch. 
The USIA was an independent foreign affairs agency within the executive 
branch: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Eisenhower had 
the authority to direct the groupʼs policy and content decisions.
At the end of the U.S. Occupation of Japan in April 1952, the State 
Department took over the information and education program that had 
been run by the Civil Information and Education section of the SCAP. After 
the creation of the USIA in Washington in 1953, USIS Japan assumed this 
responsibility.51 USIS Japan had its headquarters in the American Embassy 
in Tokyo, and established sixteen regional public affairs ofﬁces and fourteen 
information centers, popularly known as American Cultural Centers, in 
major cities in the early 1950s.52
The U.S. ambassador was the chief American ofﬁcer in Japan on all 
matters of cultural policy, so the embassy worked with the assistant directors 
of the USIS to prepare an initial statement of USIS objectives in Japan. The 
Psychological Ofﬁce of the Far Eastern Command in Japan was also involved 
in planning the cultural propaganda programs in Japan. Those plans were 
routed to the USIA in Washington, as well as to the State Department and 
other executive agencies concerned with foreign policy.53
According to the “USIS Country Plan-Japan Part 1” dated June 24, 1953, 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles issued “the objectives of American 
cultural campaign against communism in Japan:”
1. To promote orderly political, economic, and social progress based 
upon free, democratic institutions.
48 Ibid., 31.
49 For a detailed study on USIA, see Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States 
Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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51 Ibid., 42.
52 Ibid., 43.
53 Ibid., 44.
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2. To convince the Japanese of the threat of Soviet and Chinese 
communism to the realization of Japanʼs legitimate aspirations; of the 
fallacy of neutralist or “third force” concepts as solutions; and of the 
necessity for taking appropriate measures for national security.
3. To encourage cooperation with the United States and other Free World 
nations for world peace, progress, and security.54
The document also listed practical plans to achieve the stated objectives. 
Concerning national security, Dulles urged the USIS to inform the Japanese 
of “the threat of Soviet and Chinese communism” to increase the likelihood 
that the Japanese would accept U.S. military bases in Japan and approve 
of the security treaty with the United States. Dulles also expected the USIS 
to promote an awareness among the Japanese of the two countriesʼ mutual 
interests and to encourage popular support of Japanese rearmament for self-
defense.55
Dullesʼs focus on Japanese rearmament corresponded with a parallel 
movement in Japan. Shortly after the start of the Korean War in June 1950, 
MacArthur authorized the formation of a Japanese force consisting of 75,000 
men to compensate for the American forces that left Japan for Korea. Due 
to the constitutional prohibition on maintaining a military force in Japan, 
this force was called the National Police Reserve (Keisatsu yobi tai). Later, the 
U.S.–Japan security treaty, signed on the same day as the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty in September 1951, approved the expansion of the National Police 
Reserve to 110,000 men and renamed it the National Security Force（Hoan 
tai）in mid-1952. Next, the Self-Defense Forces Act enabled the establishment 
of the Defense Agency on July 1, 1954, and the National Security Force was 
reorganized as the Japan Self-Defense Forces, comprising the Ground Self-
Defense Force (Army), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (Navy), and the Air 
Self-Defense Force (Air Force).
Prime Minister Yoshida rejected the U.S. governmentʼs frequent demands 
to dramatically increase Japanʼs Self-Defense Forces, taking advantage 
of Article 9. He explained that in order for Japan to increase the size of its 
defense forces, the public must ﬁrst consent to writing a new constitution. 
With such a shrewdly reasoned opposition to its overall aims in Japan, the 
United States felt that it had no choice but to alter popular opinion in Japan.
54 Department of State, “USIS Country Plan-Japan Part 1, “24 June 1953 Conﬁdential File 
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III.  Private Organization-Initiated Cultural Propaganda Activity 
in Japan
Following a description of the cultural and political background for 
the launching of U.S. propaganda in post-occupation Japan, a case study of 
an actual propaganda ﬁeld operation should be reviewed here. In Natalia 
Tsvetkovaʼs comparative study on international education by the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, she argues that while the Soviet 
government targeted youths from social groups of lower status, believing 
them “to be more likely to become a foundation for establishing a pro-Soviet 
elite in a long-term perspective,” the U.S. government targeted “existing 
dominant groups” when it implemented programs designed to inculcate 
capitalist and liberal democratic attitudes and dispositions.” She concludes 
that the American approach was more effective in the long term.56
Indeed, the main objectives of the U.S. governmentʼs cultural exchange 
program were to foster pro-American sentiment among Japanʼs dominant 
class and to educate future leaders to become pro-Americans who would 
keep Japan in the free world. Moreover, the U.S. programs were targeted 
to “existing dominant groups” consisting of afﬂuent educated elites, such 
as pro-American conservatives in business, industry, and politics, as well 
as pro-American “liberal” academics and journalists. This target group was 
ideologically antagonistic toward “progressive” (Marxist) intellectuals, the 
very individuals whom the U.S. hoped to bring around to their point of 
view. To exert such inﬂuence, the U.S. implemented a program of cultural 
exchange. These programs often relied on private organizations to spearhead 
their efforts, ostensibly rendering them independent of the government.
Following the end of the Occupation in 1952, the U.S. government 
launched a massive cultural propaganda campaign against communism in 
Japan through USIS programs, including the USISʼs pamphlet distribution 
and propaganda ﬁlm exhibitions organized through American Cultural 
Centers. However, the State Department favored activity by non-
governmental institutions (NGOs) in the ﬁeld of cultural relations. However, 
despite ostentatious independence, the cultural exchange programs initiated 
by private organizations were tightly coordinated with the USIS. The whole 
effort was geared toward enhancing a mutual understanding between the 
people of the United States and Japan.57
56 Natalia Tsvetkova, “International Education during the Cold War: Soviet Social 
Transformation and American Social Reproduction.” Comparative Education Review, vol. 52, 
no. 2 (May 2008): 213–214.
57 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 108.
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The ﬁrst government-backed private philanthropist in charge of a 
cultural affairs exchange program was J. D. Rockefeller III of the Rockefeller 
Foundation. After submitting his recommendations on a U.S. cultural 
exchange program to Secretary of State Dulles in January 1951, Rockefeller 
returned to Tokyo as a private citizen in October 1951, intending to 
implement his strategy of developing contacts with key Japanese intellectual 
leaders with the full backing of the U.S. government. In fact, the strategy of 
emphasizing the “private nature” of his efforts was also suggested by Saxton 
E. Bradford, a public relations ofﬁcer at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, who 
wrote to Rockefeller in a memorandum dated November 7, 1951. Bradford 
said that a segment of Japanese intellectuals was apparently anti-American 
and opposed any peace treaty ﬁnalized with only the U.S. bloc and excluding 
the Soviet Union and mainland China. He called for the resumption of an 
intellectual exchange program between the U.S. and Japan. He said that a 
private, NGO-initiated exchange program would be the most signiﬁcant 
and plausible way to change the perceptions of some of the anti-American 
intellectuals in Japan.58 With this tacit agreement in place, if cooperation was 
secured from the Japanese, Rockefeller was ready to support the project with 
funds from his foundation.
In Tokyo, Rockefeller soon found the right people to help implement 
his plan through “selective and direct channels.”59 As mentioned, before the 
war, Rockefeller had been acquainted with prominent Japanese ﬁnanciers, 
politicians, and intellectuals, including Aisuke Kabayama, who was the 
founder of Japanʼs Kyodo News Agency and an early leader of the America–
Japan Society (Nichi-Bei Kyōkai); Tamon Maeda, who was the ﬁrst postwar 
education minister; Yasaka Takagi, who was the former leader of the Japanese 
Institute of Paciﬁc Relations; and Shigeharu Matsumoto, who was the former 
chief of the editorial bureau of the Domei News Agency. Rockefeller met 
them at the 1929 Institute of Paciﬁc Relations (IPR) conference in Kyoto.60 
After the long interval imposed by the war, they met again in 1951.61 Among 
these prominent Japanese, Rockefeller found Matsumoto to be the most 
active leader and observed that he was deeply committed to the promotion of 
U.S.–Japan cultural exchange.62 Rockefellerʼs prewar connections comprised 
a direct channel for developing contacts with Japanese intellectuals.
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This Japanese elite team led by Rockefeller and Matsumoto launched an 
academic exchange program between Japan and the United States in the early 
1950s with ﬁnancial assistance from both the Rockefeller Foundation, and J. 
D. Rockefeller III as an individual.63 First, the team worked together to create 
a base for international intellectual exchange in Japan in 1955 by establishing 
the International House of Japan (the so-called I-House) in Roppongi, Tokyo. 
This handsome building, with its beautiful Japanese-style garden, became a 
gateway for nongovernmental cultural exchange and intellectual cooperation 
between the people of Japan and those of other countries.64 The project 
was made possible by ﬁnancial support from the Rockefeller Foundation 
and prominent Japanese politicians and business leaders. For example, the 
incumbent Prime Minister Yoshida, Finance Minister Hayato Ikeda, and 
then-Secretary of Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa secured a site and raised 
funds for the I-House.65
This cross-cultural association between the Japanese team, led by 
Matsumoto and Yasaka Takagi, and the U.S. team, comprising prominent 
Japan scholars such as Hugh Borton and Edwin O. Reischauer, proceeded 
with actual operations. However, as Fumiko Fujita shows in her studies, 
conﬂicts of interest immediately sprang up between the Japanese and the 
Americans. From the American perspective, the programʼs main purpose 
was to interact with individuals embodying various ideological shades of 
the Japanese intellect, especially those who leaned left, to help them gain a 
better understanding of American democracy. However, the Japanese side 
did not want to include a broad swath of leftist intellectuals in their efforts. 
Rather, Matsumotoʼs group primarily wanted only those in Matsumoto and 
Takagiʼs own cliquish circle, those individuals who had the same ideological 
inclinations— liberal, capitalist “100% pro-Americans”—and excluding 
“progressive” intellectuals.66 Makoto Iokibe, in his study of U.S.–Japan 
intellectual exchange, argues that “Matsumoto and the I-House group were 
supported and highly respected by those in Japanʼs ʻestablishment,ʼ” [i.e. 
conservative, anti-communist, political leaders and business and industrial 
leaders], “but they did not represent the paciﬁst-leftist coalition that 
dominated the academic and intellectual currents at the time.”67
In the 1950s, the political and intellectual worlds were sharply polarized, 
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reﬂecting the Cold War division. The Japanese intellectual community, as a 
collective, bitterly regretted the war of Imperial Japan and fervently wished 
for peace and the healthy development of democracy. Following the end of 
the war, leftists, especially communists who claimed they had justly opposed 
the war and had therefore been oppressed by the militaristic government, 
gained more prominence in postwar Japanese politics. These groups, called 
“progressive” forces, proclaimed themselves the guardians of “peace and 
democracy.” When the U.S. Occupation changed its policy to address the 
Cold War situation in Japan in its so-called “reverse course,” these leftists—
socialists and communists alike—fanned anti-American sentiment. These 
leftist factions could barely tolerate Japanʼs conservative government, which 
appeared to meekly follow U.S. dictates, and were vocally antagonistic 
toward the pro-American Japanese.
While the Japanese intellectual circle was leaning toward the left, being 
viewed as pro-American was professionally risky.68 Still, intellectuals such as 
Matsumoto, Takagi, and the others who were involved in the founding of the 
I-House, shared democratic values and were pro-Americans who supported 
Japanʼs “establishment.”
In such a polarized climate, it was natural for Matsumoto to choose 
candidates who were his friends or students as Japanese delegates to the 
U.S. However, for the Americans, this selection was problematic: it meant 
that the program simply reinforced the existing pro-American elite strata of 
Japanese society, rather than radically transforming the anti-American mood 
among the prevailing leftist intellectuals. Until 1959, when this program 
was discontinued, the same conﬂicts and tensions over the selection of 
participants remained between the partnered groups.69
In the early 1950s, Japanese conservative politics were also split. One 
faction, led by Prime Minister Yoshida, prioritized rebuilding the economy 
and was wary of rearmament. Yoshida established the Self Defense Forces 
under pressure—and with ﬁnancial support—from the U.S. government 
in 1954: he then left ofﬁce.70 The other faction, led by Yoshidaʼs rival Ichiro 
Hatoyama and Nobusuke Kishi, advocated revising the constitution and 
rearming.71 In 1955, these two factions were combined into the Liberal 
Democratic Party of Japan (LDP). Hatoyama and Kishi (the present Premier 
Abeʼs grandfather) each became prime minister and pushed for constitutional 
68 Ibid., 76.
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revisions and rearmament.
Meanwhile, following the Korean War truce in 1953, another lethal 
accident, the Lucky Dragon Incident, helped aggravate Japanese unease 
regarding the U.S. In 1954, a Japanese tuna boat named Lucky Dragon 
was contaminated with deadly radioactive ash from a U.S. thermonuclear 
(“hydrogen”) bomb test on Bikini Island. This incident ignited sentiments 
that were anti-war, anti-nuclear weapon, and anti-U.S., and strengthened 
Japanʼs commitment to paciﬁsm.
Political factionalism and international power struggles made the 
Japanese public increasingly uneasy and allowed progressive intellectuals 
to spread their ideas widely through journals and newspaper articles. In fact, 
progressive (Marxist-oriented) Japanese, especially at the larger national 
universities, advocated the idea that the Soviet Union and mainland China 
were peace-loving, whereas the capitalist countries, including the United 
States, were the aggressive imperialists. They also warned that Japanʼs 
alliance with the United States not only endangered its security but also 
encroached on Japanʼs independence. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s (and 
perhaps also through the present), these progressive intellectuals were 
inﬂuential in shaping Japanese public opinion through their skillful use of 
the mass media.72
This polarization of pro-American establishment supporters and anti-
American intellectuals had long been recognized and acknowledged by 
the United States government. In 1955, the USIA set out to investigate the 
opinions of Japanese intellectuals. Although the term “intellectual” was never 
deﬁned, the term broadly referred to every Japanese “who has been to or is 
attending a university.”73 In particular, the USIA considered professors, critics, 
and journalists, who had a signiﬁcant impact on public opinion through 
higher education and mass media, to be the most important intellectuals. A 
report entitled “Japanese Intellectuals,” dated December 1, 1955, argued that 
intellectuals in Japan opposed U.S. foreign policy, particularly abhorring the 
U.S. pressure on Japan to rearm. Moreover, nearly all intellectuals favored 
Japanʼs establishment of political relations with mainland China.74
In this political climate, in 1956, Japan and the Soviet Union signed a 
Joint Declaration restoring diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
As a favor, the Soviet Union supported Japanʼs application for United Nations 
(UN) membership, allowing Japan to join the UN in 1956. In 1957, the Soviet 
72 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 53.
73 Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan, 48.
74 Operations Coordinating Board, “Japanese Intellectuals” December 1, 1955 Psychological 
warfare ﬁle, MR91-106 #1 Eisenhower Library, Kansas. Cited in Saeki, U.S. Cultural Propaganda 
in Cold War Japan, 49.
RJIS［Vol. 27, 2019］76
success in launching a satellite, Sputnik, before the United States could do so, 
bolstered the leftist intellectualsʼ view that Japan should not side exclusively 
with the U.S., and if Japan could not remain neutral, it should side with the 
Soviet Union.
As the Cold War antagonism in Asia and Europe affected Japanʼs 
security, Japanʼs paciﬁst-leftist intellectuals grew increasingly anti-American: 
they supported peace and opposed rearmament. These movements were 
entangled with the widespread opposition to the Kishi cabinetʼs proposed 
revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Intellectualsʼ skepticism toward 
the U.S. and the progressivesʼ inﬂuence over the public were revealed in 
the form of a massive protest by the Japanese people against the revision: in 
May and June 1960, unprecedentedly huge demonstrations against the treaty 
ﬁlled the streets of Tokyo and all other major cities, forcing the cancellation 
of a planned visit of President Eisenhower to Japan.75
The U.S. government was shocked by the Japanese publicʼs violent 
reaction. It had engaged in outreach for decades, working toward a pro-
American Japan, yet its efforts had seemingly failed. Edwin O. Reischauer, 
who was then a professor of Japanese history at Harvard University, a former 
Special Assistant in the Ofﬁce of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department 
of State, and one of the American committee members in the U.S.–Japan 
intellectual interchange program, explained the state of U.S.–Japan relations 
in his article, aptly titled “The Broken Dialogue with Japan” and published in 
the October 1960 issue of Foreign Affairs.
In the article, Reischauer assessed the reasons the US government failed 
to maintain the favor of the ordinary Japanese. Reischauer maintained that 
the 1960 security treaty controversy was “a consequence of the conservative 
versus progressive” polarization caused by the lack of a unifying core of 
ideals stemming from dramatic social and ideological change during the 
Occupation. He pointed out that most opposition to the Liberal Democrats 
and their policy of alliance with the United States was harbored by 
moderate democrats, such as supporters of the Socialist Party and the newly 
formed Democratic Socialists, which included intellectuals and journalists. 
Reischauer described these people as mostly “sincere believers in democracy” 
who were “devoted to the ideal of international peace.”76 He criticized them as 
well, saying that “few intellectuals seem to have given serious thought to the 
question [of] whether Japan can maintain true neutrality and independence 
75 Ibid., 81.
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without ﬁrst rearming.... Japanese intellectuals have not realistically faced 
the logical conclusions of the course they advocate.”77
However, Reischauer also admitted faults in the U.S. strategy, pointing 
out that the U.S. had failed to make a concerted effort to understand the 
mindset and thoughts of Japanese intellectuals and engaged in limited direct 
contact with them. In his view, the U.S. Embassy had instead been inclined 
to engage in more contact with “English-speaking businessmen and with 
conservative political leaders” who already shared more of the American 
point of view on world problems. He pointed out the importance of the U.S. 
governmentʼs realization of the great gap in thinking separating those in 
power, the intellectuals, and other leaders of the opposition. He highlighted 
the need to devote more attention to the intellectuals who were responsible 
for shaping popular opinion on national issues, and he recommended that 
the United States open a dialogue with not only the pro-American Japanese 
in power but also with the skeptical anti-American Japanese intellectuals.78
Concluding Remarks
Although the U.S. government had been trying to engage with the 
people of Japan through both privately initiated cultural exchanges and 
government-sponsored programs, such as the Fulbright Program, since 
the early 1950s, its efforts related to the 1960 ﬁasco over the security treaty 
revision seemed to be in vain. This was perhaps because both efforts targeted 
the same group. Those who could speak and understand English well enough 
to pass the competitive selection process to become exchange students to 
the United States were from afﬂuent, long-established families of a high 
social class—precisely the demographic which was already primarily pro-
American. Candidates who were academically gifted, but were communist 
sympathizers or followed another shunned ideology were excluded from the 
programs. Thus, as Reischauer admitted, the U.S. cultural exchange program 
was—whether intentionally or unintentionally—exclusive, admitting 
only the Japanese people from “existing dominant groups,” as stated by 
Natalia Tsvetkova in her study.79 Neither governmental nor private cultural 
exchange programs were immune to this bias. An inherent ﬂaw may have 
been that this kind of privately initiated program, especially one funded by 
a philanthropic giant, had signiﬁcant social status attached to it—signiﬁcant 
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.; Iokibe, “U.S.-Japan Intellectual Exchange,” 79; Fujita, “The U.S.-Japan Intellectual 
Interchange Program and U.S.-Japanese Relations in the 1950s,” 80–81.
79 Tsvetkova, “International Education during the Cold War,” 213–214.
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enough that only a select few from the establishment were typically selected. 
Thus, owing to the exclusion of unsympathetic candidates, the enormous 
gap in perception regarding the U.S. and the global outlook among the 
conservative Japanese elites, left-leaning Japanese intellectuals, and ordinary 
people remained unchanged, if not further widened.
Reischauerʼs analysis in 1960 of the U.S.–Japan security treaty controversy 
eerily resonates today with the recent protests over the 2015 security bill. 
The gap in perception between the conservative government and ordinary 
citizens about security issues is still deep and wide. Moreover, paciﬁst tenets 
are entrenched in the Japanese psyche. The Fundamental Law of Education 
that controls compulsory education states that the objective of postwar 
education is to construct a democratic and peaceful nation.80 In teaching the 
paciﬁst Article 9 to youths, psychological disarmament had an extremely 
potent, long-lasting effect on Japanese minds. All Japanese children learn 
that the constitution of Japan is the ﬁrst in human history that prohibits the 
use of military force to realize world peace in writing. They learn that this 
ideal constitution was the result of the deep regret of the Japanese regarding 
their aggressiveness during World War II.
For the Japanese, peace and democracy are one organic concept. In 
reality, however, “democracy” and “peace” are separate matters. The United 
States, the very nation that demanded that this constitution be enforced, is 
the most potent military power in the world. In fact, the United States has 
used the banner of democracy to wage war, both before and after World War 
II, proving that peace and democracy are not two sides of the same coin, as 
the Japanese have been taught.
Because of Japanʼs paciﬁst constitution, along with a postwar education 
that emphasizes peace, the Japanese have been loath to accept any policies 
hinting of war or the military. Since the countryʼs wartime defeat, anything 
indicative of “patriotism” has had a negative connotation, as it could be 
construed as referring to the former militaristic Japan. Most importantly, ever 
since the Japanese lost the war, its values and history, which all Japanese were 
taught to protect and preserve with their lives during the war, were also lost: 
these were replaced with abstract ideas such as peace and democracy. There 
has been no deep discussion on the meaning of “peace” for Japan. “Peace,” 
as the absence of military combat, is an idea held dear by the Japanese, but 
the world has seen many unending wars and conﬂicts since World War II. 
With these concepts inextricably linked in the Japanese mind, even when the 
United States wanted Japan to ﬁght against communism or, more recently, 
against terrorism, Japan has remained reluctant to engage. Now, seven 
80 Iichi Sagara, “Education, Fundamental Law of,” in Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan.
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decades after Japanʼs defeat, Japan has become economically successful 
and has gained political freedom and ideological diversity; meanwhile, the 
country is wandering aimlessly without a vision for its role in the global 
community.
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